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Downs Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Perwaja Steel SDN BHD 
[2002] 2 Qd R 462 
 
Editorial  Remarks 
Dr. Bruno Zeller 
 
This is an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland.1 The issue in brief was 
whether the remedies for a breach of contract were properly determined. Furthermore 
the application of the principle of fundamental breach was also questioned. As such 
the pertinent principles in articles 74 and 75 as well as articles 63 and 64(1) of the 
CISG were considered.. 
 
From the outset two observations can be made. First of the 44 cited cases only two 
Delchi Carrier SpA v Rotorex Corp2 and Roder Zelt- und Hallenbaukonstruktionen 
GmbH v Rosedown Park Pty Ltd (in liq)3 had any connection to the CISG. The 
remainder were only relevant in domestic matters.  
 
Secondly  towards the end of the original trial the procedural law changed in 
Queensland. . Previously a party was only required to state the facts and could rely on 
the legal consequences which “properly flowed from the material facts pleaded.”4 The 
change brought about by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules was that a party was 
obliged “if a claim or defense under the Act is relied on” to identify the specific 
provisions under the Act.5 The problem, and a cause of the appeal, was that 44 days 
after close of the original trial the judge called the parties together to inform them that 
the CISG emerged as the applicable law. Arguably the judge should and could have 
advised the parties as soon as the change became apparent to amend their pleadings or 
simply call for a new trial. The change of the Rules entered into force after the trial 
commenced but before it finished.  
 
Of particular interest in this case is not the judgment itself but the arguments of 
counsel for the appellant as well as the respondent. The arguments displayed a lack of 
understanding of the CISG and its implications. It should be clear from the beginning 
that by merely touching upon two relevant CISG cases a real understanding of the 
CISG has been achieved. This was an opportunity and an invitation to consider the 




Counsel for the appellant contended that in the original case the claim had been 
framed on “the basis that the correct measure of loss was as set out in s51 of the 
domestic Sale of Goods Act.”6  As a consequence it was pleaded that the respondent 
                                                 
1 For the initial case see Downs Investment Pty Ltd v Perwaja Steel SDN BHD [2000] QSC 421 (17 
November 2000) 
2 71 F 3d 1024 (2nd Cir 1995) 
3 (1995) 57 FCR 216 
4 Downs investments Pty Ltd v Perwaja Steel [2002] 2 Qd R 462, at 472. 
5 Ibid aee R149(e) at 472. 
6 Downs investments at 463. 
should be estopped form relying upon the CISG.7 Both these arguments are 
extraordinary. First if the pleading was based on the Sale of Goods Act then the 
appellant ought to have urged the court to ask the plaintiff to redraw its claims. 
Secondly the principle as discussed in Perry Engineering8 should have been applied 
where under similar circumstance the master rejected a claim and noted that “this 
seems to me to be fatal to the plaintiff's ability to proceed to judgment ..."9.   
 
Instead the appellant argues estoppel, The question of course is since when can a 
respondent be estopped from pleading the appropriate law?  It should have been 
abundantly clear at least at the appeal stage that the CISG is the governing law to the 
exclusion of the Sale of Goods Act.  
 
The appellant is correct in suggesting that the trial judge erred by deciding the case on 
a different basis as from those disclosed by the pleadings. However the appeal should 
have been made on grounds of denial of justice, which arguably were considered in 
allowing this appeal and not on grounds of an application of the wrong law. 
 
The effect as mentioned above should have been that the pleadings are to be redrawn 
or the matter is listed again. However the appellant does not have this outcome in 
mind. They simply contend that the respondent was not entitled to a judgment based 
on the convention and that “there is no injustice in holding a party to that fundamental 
principle of pleading.”10 The point is that the appellant by quoting domestic law 
assumes the position that the Sale of Goods Act is the proper law whereas it is not. 
There is indeed injustice if any party would be estopped form pleading the proper and 
only applicable law.  
 
 The argument that the trial judge failed to give proper regard to article 63 when 
determining whether a fundament breach occurred is a valid though weak point. 
Interestingly enough counsel argued that the trial judge applied article 64(1) in a 
flawed fashion as “reference was made which would satisfy the common law doctrine 
or repudiation.”11  The fact is that neither counsel understood the application of the 
CISG fully and hence such a remark is rather strange. The point is that article 63 is 
discretionary in character and does not need to be invoked.  If the plaintiff believes 
that a fundamental breach has occurred, and the court accepts that argument, article 
63 does not need to be relied on. Even a cursory investigation of academic writing on 
this point would have clarified this matter.   
 
The most interesting argument is that the appellant contended that articles 75 and 74 
were wrongly applied. In relation to article 75 it was contended that the purpose of 
this article only involves the resale of goods which were the subject of the contract 
and not any other goods. This appears to be a novel approach in interpreting article 75 
and more to the point no case law or academic writing was offered in support of such 
a contention. Indeed one would be hard pressed to find any interpretation of article 75 
to support such a contention. 
                                                 
7 Downs at 464. 
8 Perry Eng P/L (Rec and Man Appt’d) v Bernold AG No. SCGRG-99-1063 [2001] 
SASC 15 (1 February 2001) 
9 Ibid. 
10 ibid at 464. 
11 ibid at 465. 
 
It was further argued that the trial judge ignored the plain meaning of article 74 and 
overcompensated the respondent “in a manner which would not have been 
countenanced by the common law.”12 Counsel supported the contention by relying on 
several municipal judgments. Again as noted previously article 7 of the CISG 
specifically noted that regard has to be had to the international character of the 
convention. This has been interpreted as meaning that recourse to domestic law is not 
allowed. It is a hallmark of this case that both counsel have not taken note of article 7 
otherwise arguments such as the above would not have been contemplated.  
 
Furthermore the appellant stated that there is a conceptual difficulty in relying on 
article 74 as well as article 75: 
 
“The difficulty is that under art 74 the respondent must invite the court to 
assume that it would have recovered its expenses in performing the contract in 
circumstances where it is also asking the court to award a form of expectation 
loss under art 75 or art 76.”13 
 
Predictably this assertion was backed up by municipal law in contravention of article 
7 of the CISG. It is obvious that article 75 and 76 are to be consulted in this instance 
as the respondent claimed fundamental breach. Equally well it should have been 
understood that the respondent has not lost any additional rights under article 74 by 
relying on either article 75 and 76. The wording of article 74 as well as academic 
writing and jurisprudence makes it abundantly clear that article 74 cannot be used to 
enrich the plaintiff. It can be used to claim those damages which are not recoverable 





Not surprisingly the respondent also did not distinguish between action under the 
CISG and common law and noted that a termination of the contract was justified 
“whether one applied the Convention or the common law.”14 Such a contention is 
wrong as only the convention is applicable to the exclusion of the common law. 
Furthermore counsel still persisted in arguing that they were not required to “plead the 
legal consequences which flow from a breach  …. [and hence] it is not a claim under 
the Convention [which] merely codifies the law of contract to be applied.”15  Such 
comments are not in line with article 7. Interestingly though at a later stage counsel 
for the respondent did make a comment which reflects the meaning of article 7 by 
noting that: 
 
 “the convention specifically requires interpretation by member states in a 
manner which promotes uniformity in application.”16 
 
                                                 
12 ibid 467. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid 468. 
15 ibid 469. 
16 ibid 471. 
Such a claim sounds rather hollow considering that domestic legislation and 
jurisprudence has been quoted to support the respondent’s arguments. Also if counsel 
would have understood the ramifications of article 7 then a statement that article 74 
reflects the common law as stated in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341 would not 
have been made. 
 
Furthermore Delchi Carrier SpA v Rotorex was quoted. It is ironic that the only case 
which was relied upon is noted by many scholars as an example where the court could 
not overcome its ethnocentric interests. A. Kritzer in his editorial noted specific 
instances and one note is sufficient to illustrate the problems. The court's syllogism, 
he notes,  was as an example the reasoning that:  
 
"[c]ase law interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (`UCC') may also inform where the language of the relevant 
CISG provisions tracks that of the UCC";17 
 
In sum it can be argued that counsel for both parties did not use the CISG in its 
intended form and neglected to construct their arguments with article 7 firmly in their 
sights.  
 
The Courts Decision 
 
From a practical point of view the CISG will apply whatsoever and absent the delayed 
introduction of the CISG by Ambrose J in the original trial none of the arguments 
would amount to any meaningful justification of an appeal 
 
Also it appears  that the way this matter has been argued the lessons from the original 
judgment have not been learned. It is not surprising that the court rejected the appeal. 
Interestingly the appellant did admit that prior to the trial the CISG was considered 
but “had been put back on the shelf because it wasn’t relevant to the case.”18 This 
appeared to be a fatal error and the consequences are exposed in this appeal. The court 
did look at the appropriate facts in deciding the relevance of article 63 and noted that 
it was not relevant as the appellant was already in fundamental breach. Unfortunately 
the court did not explain the relationship between articles 64 and 25 to come their 
conclusion.  
 
The problem again is that the court also did justify their reasoning by reverting to 
domestic jurisprudence and equated a fundamental breach with a rescission of the 
contract. Furthermore the court rejected the appellant’s contention that the judge used 
the term of “repudiation” in his judgment by arguing that it is clear that the CISG 
“adopts to some extent the common law concept of repudiation.”19 This again is 
taking the wrong view. Arguably it could be that the outcome of a repudiation may 
arrive at the same result as an application of fundamental breach under the CISG. 
However to argue that the outcomes are the same therefore the concept must be the 
same is not correct. The treatment of fundamental breach is unique. It is a “fresh legal 
concept … [and] … has no parentage in other jurisdictions”.20    
                                                 
17 See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/editorial/951206u1editorial.html#damages2 
18 Downs Investment above n4, at 475. 
19 ibid at 481. 
20 Will, M in Bianca & Bonell (ed) Commentary on the International Sales Law, (1987) Milan,  at 210 
 
It must be noted that the court did discuss the issues and surprisingly did come to the 
correct conclusion however without as one would expect consulting academic writing 
and foreign judgments.  
 
